



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE CORPS BASE
PSC BOX 20004
CAMP LEJEUNE, NORTH CAROLINA 28542-0004

BO 5500.3B
BPMO

06 JAN 1999

BASE ORDER 5500.3B

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: BOMB THREAT RESPONSE PLAN

Ref: (a) MCO P5580.2
(b) BO P3571.1

Encl: (1) Bomb Threat Report
(2) Bomb Threat Checklist
(3) Sample Building/Facility Bomb Threat Plan
(4) Search Techniques

1. Purpose. To establish procedures and responsibilities in the event of a bomb (Improvised Explosive Device (IED)) threat at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and to amplify the guidelines set forth in references (a) and (b).

2. Cancellation. BO 5500.3A.

3. Background. Bomb threats interrupt/disrupt the lives and mission of our Marines, Sailors, dependents, and civilian personnel. It is, therefore, necessary to articulate protocols and procedures designed to eliminate or reduce the potential of bomb threats, and, if necessary, provide appropriate response to found IED's.

4. Information

a. Sound procedures, i.e., telephone protocols, building/facility bomb search plans, found bomb/suspicious package procedures, and emergency response procedures, etc., that are practiced regularly accomplish two things: (1) reduce the time it takes to ensure a building/facility is clear of any IED's; (2) reduce the potential for future bomb threats because the caller's desired effect (personnel evacuated from buildings/facilities, work stoppage, and the arrival of large numbers of emergency vehicles) is reduced or eliminated.

b. Experience has shown that a bomb threat will normally be received at one of two places: (1) the specific building/facility involved (i.e., Exchange, Commissary, Base Headquarters, company offices, etc.), or (2) an authoritative agency, i.e., Military Police (MP) Desk Sergeant, Fire Protection Division, sentry booths, duty NCO, etc. Regardless of the actual recipient, certain pertinent information may be ascertained which will aid investigators, bomb threat teams, etc., in locating the IED and may assist in the apprehension of the person making the threat and/or planting the device. Personnel who may be in the position to receive such a threat should be instructed to transcribe the conversation in writing as soon as possible. Enclosures (1) and (2) contain information which the recipient of a bomb threat call should try to obtain before the caller hangs up.

c. Written threats should be handled/touched only if absolutely necessary, and turned over to the MP's as soon as possible.

d. The decision to evacuate a bomb-threatened building/facility rests solely with the person responsible for the personnel, e.g., CO or OIC, or government assets contained therein. The decision to evacuate the building/facility can be made anytime after the threat has been received, i.e., immediately following the threat, after a search has been completed, or if and when an IED is found. History has shown that the majority of bomb threats are without substance.

e. Two reasonable explanations for calls reporting bomb threats at a particular location are that the caller:

(1) Has definite knowledge or believes that an IED has been or will be placed and wants to minimize personal injury or property damage, and/or

(2) Wants to create an atmosphere of anxiety/panic which will, in turn, possibly result in a disruption of the normal activities at the building/facility where the device is purportedly located.

5. Action

a. General/Special Staff, Commanding Officers, Department Heads, Officers In Charge, etc., will develop and promulgate bomb threat procedures, enclosure (3), for each building/facility under their control, as follows:

(1) Designate personnel, by billet/position, who have the authority to evacuate the threatened building/facility, if necessary, and resume normal operations.

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(2) Designate personnel, by billet/position, who are closely familiar with the threatened building/facility, to make a search of the premises. Suggested search techniques are contained in enclosure (4).

(3) Designate search procedures beginning at the most critical areas of each building/facility.

(4) Ensure that the evacuated threatened building/facility is completely emptied.

(5) Ensure that predesignated muster points for evacuated personnel are at least 500 feet away from the threatened structure and away from glass windows. These muster points should be the same for fire drills.

(6) Ensure that a designated supervisor accounts for personnel at each muster point. The supervisor is responsible for notifying the person authorized to evacuate the building/facility of any suspicious packages found, and/or of personnel not accounted for.

(7) Recall personnel intimately familiar with the threatened building/facility to conduct searches for IED's.

(8) Provide the Provost Marshal's Office (PMO), with daytime/nighttime recall numbers of personnel authorized to evacuate the threatened building/facility.

(9) Ensure that all office, storage, and utility rooms are secured when not in actual use.

(10) Ensure that personnel are trained on IED recognition procedures at least annually, or when there is a 30 percent changeover of personnel.

(11) Ensure that keys to the locked areas are available.

(12) Ensure timely notification of emergency services personnel, i.e., Fire Protection Division, MP's, etc.

(13) Ensure that all personnel responsible for answering telephones are well versed in the contents of enclosures (1) and (2).

(14) Ensure that copies of enclosures (1) and (2) are kept by all telephones.

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(15) Ensure that enclosures (1) and (2) are filled out completely. Give a copy of enclosure (2) with enclosure (1) attached to the Military Police upon their arrival.

(16) Ensure that all personnel are instructed:

(a) To report all suspicious persons and packages.

(b) Not to touch any suspicious packages or suspected IED's.

(17) Ensure that drills are conducted at least annually to test these procedures.

(18) Ensure that the Building/Facility Bomb Threat Response Plan is reviewed and updated annually or as significant changes occur. This will ensure that valid, accurate information is maintained in the Plan for an emergency situation.

b. Emergency service agencies (PMO, Fire Protection Division, Naval Hospital, Explosives Ordnance Disposal, and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), etc.) will:

(1) Coordinate emergency response to all bomb threat situations.

(2) If a building is evacuated, make contact with the person responsible for the building to determine whether:

(a) All personnel from the threatened site are accounted for.

(b) Any suspicious packages or bombs have been found.

(3) Review coordinated emergency response procedures at least semi-annually.

6. Summary of Revision. This revision should be reviewed completely since it contains a substantial number of changes.

7. Reserve Applicability. This Order is applicable to the Marine Corps Reserve.

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8. Concurrence. This Order has been coordinated with and concurred in by the Commanding Generals, II Marine Expeditionary Force; 2d Marine Division; 2d Force Service Support Group; and II MEF Augmentation Command Element, and the Commanding Officers of the Naval Hospital and Naval Dental Center, Camp Lejeune.


B. A. GOMBAR
Chief of Staff

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BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST

1. DO NOT HANG UP THE TELEPHONE.
2. Questions to ask: Exact words of the conversation.
 - a. When will the bomb explode?_____
 - b. Where is the bomb right now?_____

 - c. What kind of bomb is it?_____

 - d. What does the bomb look like?_____

 - e. Why did you place the bomb?_____

 - f. Where are you calling from?_____

 - g. Who is this?_____

3. Either go personally or send someone to another telephone and call the Base Operator, 451-1113 or 451-1115. If connected to the automated answering machine, immediately dial "0" to make direct contact with the operator. Report the bomb threat and telephone number/extension, _____, of the phone you left off the receiver.
4. From another phone, report the bomb threat to 911.

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- a. Time call received: _____
 - b. Time caller hung up: _____
5. Notify key personnel (CO, OIC, supervisor, etc.).
6. TRACING CALLS. If, after getting as much information as you can from the caller, and the caller hangs up, follow these procedures to trace the call:
- a. Hang up the phone. This is because the switchboard automatically disconnect the call after one party hangs up. Ensure that another call is not made from the phone line from which the threat was received.
 - b. From another phone, call the PMO at 911 to alert them of the threat.
 - c. PMO will contact the Base Telephone Office for trace information.
7. Institute Building/Facility Bomb Threat Response Plan.

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BOMB THREAT REPORT

NAME OF OPERATOR/PERSON RECEIVING CALL:				
DATE OF CALL:		Time:		a.m. p.m.
ORIGIN OF CALL:	Local	Long Distance	Phone Booth	Internal

IDENTITY OF CALLER

VOICE		LANGUAGE	
Loud	Soft	Male	Good
High Pitch	Deep	Female	Foul
Raspy	Pleasant	Adult	Poor
Intoxicated		Child	Other: _____

SPEECH		ACCENT	
Fast	Slow	Local	Foreign
Distinct	Distorted	Racial	Regional
Stutter	Nasal		

MANNER		BACKGROUND NOISES	
Calm	Angry	Office Machines	Trains
Rational	Nasal	Factory Machines	Music

1. Whom did you inform about the call? _____

2. Indicate to what extent the caller seemed familiar, if at all, with the building. _____

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3. As well as you can, write what the caller said. _____

Telephone Procedures. Complete these forms and give them to the Military Police as soon as possible. Depending on the circumstances, time is of the utmost importance.

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SAMPLE BUILDING/FACILITY BOMB THREAT PLAN

From: (Unit)
To: Distribution List

Subj: BUILDING/FACILITY BOMB THREAT RESPONSE PLAN

Ref: (a) BO 5500.3B

Encl: (1) Bomb Threat Checklist
(2) Bomb Threat Report
(3) Building/Facility Bomb Threat Plan

1. Purpose. To establish procedures and responsibilities in the event of a bomb (Improvised Explosive Device (IED)) threat at Building/Facility #_____, Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

2. Background. Bomb threats interrupt the lives of our Marines and disrupt the missions of the Base and its tenants. It is, therefore, necessary to articulate protocols and procedures designed to eliminate, or reduce, the potential of bomb threats, and, if necessary, provide appropriate response to found IED's.

3. General

a. Sound procedures, i.e., telephone protocols, building/facility bomb search plans, found bomb/suspicious package procedures, and emergency response procedures, etc., that are practiced regularly accomplish two things: (1) reduce the time it takes to ensure a building/facility is clear of any IED's; (2) reduce the potential for future bomb threats because the caller's desired effect (personnel evacuated from buildings/facilities, work stoppage, and the arrival of large numbers of emergency vehicles) is reduced or eliminated.

b. Experience has shown that normally a bomb threat will be received at one of two places: (1) the specific building/facility involved (i.e., Exchange, Commissary, Base Headquarters, company offices, etc.), or (2) an authoritative agency, i.e., Military Police Desk Sergeant, Fire Protection Division, sentry booths, duty NCO, etc. Regardless of the actual recipient, certain pertinent information may

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be ascertained which will aid investigators, bomb threat teams, etc., in locating the IED and may assist in the apprehension of the person making the threat and/or planting the device. Personnel who may be in the position to receive such a threat should be instructed to record the conversation to writing as soon as possible. Enclosures (1) and (2) contain information which the recipient of a bomb threat call should try to obtain before the caller hangs up.

c. Written threats should be handled/touched only if absolutely necessary, and turned over to the Military Police as soon as possible.

d. The decision to evacuate a bomb-threatened building/facility rests solely with the person responsible for the personnel, e.g., CO or OIC, or government assets contained therein. The decision to evacuate the building/facility can be made anytime after the threat has been received, i.e., immediately following the threat, after a search has been completed, or if and when an IED is found. History has shown that the majority of bomb threats are without substance.

4. Action

a. Senior occupant of threatened building/facility will:

(1) Authorize evacuation of building/facility number in the event of a bomb threat.

(2) Ensure that the building/facility is searched per enclosure (3). Critical areas are to be searched first.

(3) Designate muster points in the event a site is evacuated.

b. Officers in charge, staff noncommissioned officers in charge, and supervisors will ensure that:

(1) If the building/facility is evacuated, it is done so completely. Established fire drill routes should be followed.

(2) After completing a search of their areas, personnel report to their muster areas, which should be at least 500 feet away from the threatened site and away from glass windows. These muster points, which should be the same for fire drills, are identified below:

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(a) _____

(b) _____

(3) They account for all personnel and report any suspicious packages/bombs found during the search.

(4) The following personnel are recalled in the event of an after-hours bomb threat:

Personnel to Recall	Telephone
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

(5) All office, storage, and utility rooms are secured when not in actual use.

(6) Keys are available to locked areas.

(7) All personnel responsible for answering telephone calls are well versed in the contents of enclosures (1) and (2).

(8) Copies of enclosures (1) and (2) are kept adjacent to all phones.

(9) All personnel involved in the search of a building/facility are instructed not to touch any suspect packages, and report the location and description of these to their OIC/SNCOIC/supervisor.

c. Personnel involved in searching for suspicious packages will:

(1) Evacuate the building/facility, when directed, of all personnel not involved in the search of the threatened site.

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(2) Report immediately to their designated muster point after completing a search of their area of responsibility per enclosure (3).

(3) Not touch any suspicious packages, and report the location and description of those found to the OIC/SNCOIC/supervisor.

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SEARCH TECHNIQUES

(This enclosure is an excerpt from a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms document on "Bomb Threats and Search Techniques.")

ROOM SEARCH

The following technique is based on use of a two-person searching team. There are many minor variations possible in searching a room. The following contains only the basic techniques.

First - Team Action - Listening

When the two-person search team enters the room to be searched, they should first move to various parts of the room and stand quietly, with their eyes shut, and listen for a clock-work device. Frequently, a clock-work mechanism can be quickly detected without use of special equipment. Even if no clockwork mechanism is detected, the team is now aware of the background noise level within the room itself.

Background noise or transferred sound is always disturbing during a building search. In searching a building, if a ticking sound is heard, but cannot be located, one might become unnerved. The ticking sound may come from an unbalanced air conditioner fan several floors away or from a dripping sink down the hall. Sound will travel through air-conditioning ducts, along water pipes and through walls, etc. One of the worst types of buildings to search is one that has steam or water heat. This type of building will constantly thump, crack, chatter, and tick due to the movement of the steam or hot water through the pipes and the expansion and contraction of the pipes. Background noise may also be outside traffic sounds, rain, wind, etc.

Second - Team Action - Division of Room and Selection of Search Height

The person in charge of the room searching team should look around the room and determine how the room is to be divided for searching and to what height the first searching sweep should extend. The first searching sweep will cover all items resting on the floor up to the selected height.

Dividing The Room. You should divide the room into two equal parts or

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as nearly equal as possible. This equal division should be based on the number and type of objects in the room to be searched, not the size of the room. An imaginary line is then drawn between two objects on the room, i.e., the edge of the window on the north wall to the floor lamp on the south wall.

Selection of First Searching Height. Look at the furniture or objects in the room and determine the average height of the majority of items resting on the floor. In an average room, this height usually includes table or desk tops, chair backs, etc. The first searching height usually covers the items in the room up to hip height.

First - Room - Searching Sweep (Low Areas)

After the room has been divided and a searching height has been selected, both individuals go to one end of the room division line and start from a back-to-back position. This is the starting point, and the same point will be used on each successive searching sweep. Each person now starts searching his way around the room, working toward the other person, checking all items resting on the floor around the wall area of the room. When the two individuals meet, they will have completed a "wall sweep" and should then work together and check all items in the middle of the room up to the selected hip height. Don't forget to check the floor under the rugs. This first searching sweep should also include those items which may be mounted on or in the walls, such as air-conditioning ducts, baseboard heaters, built-in wall cupboards, etc., if these fixtures are below hip height. The first searching sweep usually consumes the most time and effort. During all searching sweeps, use the electronic or medical stethoscope on walls, furniture items, floors, etc.

Second - Room - Searching Sweep (Mid-height Areas)

The person in charge again looks at the furniture or objects in the room and determines the height of the second searching sweep. This height is usually from the hip to the chin or top of the head. The two individuals return to the starting point and repeat the searching techniques at the second selected searching height. This sweep usually covers pictures hanging on the walls, built-in bookcases, tall table lamps, etc.

Third - Room - Searching Sweep (High Areas)

When the second searching sweep is completed, the person in charge again determines the next searching height, usually from the chin or the top of the head up to the ceiling. The third sweep is then made. This sweep usually covers high mounted air-conditioning ducts, hanging light fixtures, etc.

Fourth - Room - Searching Sweep (Ceiling Areas)

If the room has a false or suspended ceiling, the fourth sweep involves investigation of this area. Check flush or ceiling-mounted light fixtures, air-conditioning or ventilation ducts, sound or speaker systems, electrical wiring, structural frame members, etc. Have a sign or marker posted indicating "Search Completed" conspicuously in the area. Use a piece of colored tape across the door and door jam approximately two feet above floor level if the use of signs is not practical.

The room search technique expanded. The same basic technique can be used to search a conventional airport terminal.

Restated, to search an area you should:

1. _____ Divide the area and select a search height.
2. _____ Start from the bottom and work up.
3. _____ Start back-to-back and work toward each other.
4. _____ Go around the walls then into the center of the room.

Encourage the use of common sense or logic in searching. If a guest speaker at a convention has been threatened, common sense would indicate searching the speaker's platform and microphones first, but always return to the searching technique. Do not rely on random or spot checking of only logical target areas. The bomber may not be a logical person.

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SUSPICIOUS OBJECT LOCATED

Note: It is imperative that personnel involved in the search be instructed that their mission is only to search for and report suspicious objects, not to move, jar or touch the object or anything attached thereto. The removal/disarming of a bomb must be left to the professionals in explosive ordnance disposal. Remember that bombs and explosives are made to explode, and there are no absolutely safe methods of handling them.

(1) Report the location and an accurate description of the object to the appropriate official. This information is relayed immediately to the control center who will call Police, Fire Department, and Rescue Squad. These individuals should be met and escorted to the scene.

(2) Place sandbags or mattresses, not metal shield plates, around the object. Do not attempt to cover the object.

(3) Identify the danger area, and block it off with a clear zone of at least 300 feet, including area below and above the object.

(4) Check to see that all doors and windows are open to minimize primary damage from blast and secondary damage from fragmentation.

(5) Evacuate the building.

(6) Do not permit re-entry into the building until the device has been removed/disarmed, and the building declared safe for re-entry.

We recognize your responsibility to the public and the necessity for maintaining good public relations. This responsibility also includes the safety and protection of the public. We may well be approaching the point, when in the interest of security and protection of people, some inconvenience may have to be imposed on persons visiting public buildings.

Perhaps entrances and exits can be modified with a minimal expenditure to channel all personnel through someone at a registration desk. Personnel entering the building would be required to sign a

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register showing the name and room number of the person whom they wish to visit. Employees at these registration desks could contact the person to be visited and advise him that a visitor, by name, is in the lobby. The person to be visited may, in the interest of security and protection, decide to come to the lobby to meet this individual to ascertain that the purpose of the visit is valid and official. A system for signing out when the individual departs could be integrated onto this procedure. There is no question that such a procedure would result in many complaints from the public. If it were explained to the visitor by the person at the registration desk that these procedures were implemented in their best interest and safety, the complaints would be reduced.

Other factors for consideration include:

1. _____ Installation of closed circuit television.
2. _____ Installation of metal detecting devices.
3. _____ Posting of signs indicating the use of closed circuit television or other detection devices.

The above are suggestions. In the final analysis of this entire complex problem, the decision is yours.

PROBLEMS WITH BUILDINGS

The physical construction of a building and its surrounding areas vary widely. The following are a few tips to aid search teams in their search.

Outside Areas

When you search outside areas, pay particular attention to street drainage systems, manholes in the street and in the sidewalk. Thoroughly check trash receptacles, garbage cans, dumpsters, incinerators, etc. Check parked cars and trucks. Check mail boxes if there is a history of placement in your area.

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Schools

School bombings are usually directed against non-student areas. Find out which teachers or staff members are unpopular and where they work. The main problem areas in schools are student lockers and the chemistry laboratory. Student lockers are required to be locked and accurate records of the combinations may not be available, because students change lockers at will. School authorities will arrange to have locks unsecured and the search teams will open and search the lockers. Chemistry labs should be treated with caution. Each year some student tries to make an explosive mixture or rocket fuel in the classroom, gets scared, and phones in a bomb call. The best procedure is to have the chemistry teacher inspect the classroom lab and chemical storage area with the search team. If repeated bomb threats are received, it is recommended that the school administrators hold make-up classes on Saturday. This tends to cut down the number of bomb scares.

Office Spaces

The biggest problem in office spaces is secured desks, filing cabinets, storage closets, wall lockers, etc. Personnel with access to these areas should arrange to have such items unsecured and the search team will open and search them.

MWR Facilities, Auditoriums, Gymnasiums, and the Field House

Such buildings cover a large area and have hundreds of seats and spaces which must be checked on hands and knees. Look for cut or unfastened seats with a bomb inserted into the cushion or back. Check out the stage area which has tons of equipment in it; also the speaker's platform and the microphones. The area under the stage generally has crawl ways, tunnels, trap doors, dressing rooms, and storage areas. The sound system is extensive and the air-conditioning system is unbelievable. The entire roof area, in a theater, frequently has one huge storage room and maintenance area above it. Check all hanging decorations and lighting fixtures.